The military ruled El Salvador from 1930-84. The roots of the recent repression can be traced to the 1932 massacre, La Matanza, in which approximately 30,000 indigenous campesinos were killed over a two day period for trying to become a political voice for justice for all Salvadorans. Agustin Farabundo Marti, the social revolutionary leader of this opposition, was tried and put to death in its aftermath.
By the late 70s, the social-political-economic polarization in the country had intensified. 1980 saw the formation of both the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) parties. The FMLN was formed from a coalition of five parties, including the Communist party. While it received some backing from the Soviet Union via Cuba, one has to consider what "communism" meant in context. There is no evidence of a "red scare takeover plot" ala the Cold War--the great fear of the U.S. Rather, the intention was to make decent housing, food, water, education and health care available to those who had been denied these basic rights for centuries. This political philosophy reflected the "preferential option for the poor" articulated by the Latin American bishops at Medellin, Colombia and Puebla, Mexico, that was being lived out in Christian-based communities as the practical application of liberation theology. Those church leaders who lived and worked by this preference, such as Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero or the six Jesuits, were immediately considered politically suspect for these beliefs. Their murders, by the hands of those in power, indicate how high the stakes were.
The ARENA party was founded by Roberto D'Aubuisson, who trained at the U.S.-operated School of the Americas (SOA) in Panama in 1972 and operated the death squads from 1978-92. (The SOA, now WHINSEC and located at Ft. Benning, GA, has trained well over 60,000 Latin American military personnel, hundreds of whom were responsible for the most horrendous human rights abuses committed throughout Central and South America.) In 1984, D'Aubuisson was honored at a Capitol Hill dinner in Washington, D.C. for his "inspiration to freedom-loving people everywhere."
A 1993 U.N. investigation confirmed that D'Aubuisson ordered the murder of Romero, thus starting the civil war that was waged from 1980-92. According to the U.N. Truth Commission report, the government, through the military and para-militaries, was responsible for 95% of the 75,000 war deaths. The FMLN was assigned responsibility for the remaining 5%. The U.S. was a key backer of the Salvadoran government throughout the war, investing $6 billion.
The ARENA party first won the presidency in 1989, and repeated that victory in the elections that followed the signing of the Peace Accords in 1992--until this year. While the outright fighting stopped at the end of the war, the underlying social, political and economic issues that led to it have remained unresolved under ARENA's leadership.
- Poverty is extreme as 62% of the population cannot afford life's basics. This would undoubtedly be worse if 2.5 million Salvadorans were not residing in the U.S. In 2008, 22.3% of Salvadoran families received remittances that totalled $3.8 billion. The current population is 5.7 million.
- Unemployment and underemployment are high and, of course, would be higher if so many were not living abroad. Statistics are difficult to obtain and almost meaningless as so much employment is realized through the "informal economy," e.g. selling trinkets on the bus, CDs on street corners, etc.
- Labor conditions are poor and workers' rights are commonly denied. Attempts to organize workers are regularly challenged, and union leaders' lives are at risk.
- The judicial system does not function adequately. Many people have told me that it is not that laws do not exist in El Salvador, it is that they are not enforced. The immunity granted to the perpetrators of war-time violence, after the signing of the Peace Accords, is the most egregious example of this.
- Government social investment is low. To some extent, the ARENA party acknowledges this as it included a number of increases in social spending in its platform.
- Environmental degradation continues. El Salvador has experienced significant deforestation. Mining has been introduced and, while less extensive than in Guatemala and Honduras, is responsible for increased water contamination and reduction of supply.
- Education is not easily accessible in remote communities and of poor quality in most areas. Too many children do not complete high school so have no chance of going on to the university or technical training.
- Health care delivery is poor everywhere, but especially in rural communities where about 20% of the population resides. The availability of medicines is of particular concern now. Not only is it difficult to obtain prescription medicines (even in hospitals!) but the costs are among the highest in the world. The quality of generic medicines is not regulated so they do not provide a viable alternative at this time.
- Security is a major issue. El Salvador has one of the highest homicide rates in the world, relative to its small population. Homicides averaged nine per day in 2008, and 12 per day thus far in 2009. The weekend after the election saw more than 30 people killed through probable gang violence despite almost six years of "Mano Duro" ("hard hand") and "Super Mano Duro" enforcement.
The social, political and economic systems have continued to favor the elites and multi-national corporations under ARENA. Finally, this year that privilege had to be put to a stop. While ARENA fought a campaign based on fear of the past and the future, their message ultimately did not resonate with the people. Nationally, 61% of the population voted and elected Funes by a margin of 3%. (In my traditionally ARENA voting center, probably about 70% of registered voters cast ballots.) Nationwide, there were some interesting changes in voting patterns: 46% of Evangelicals voted for the FMLN and the city of San Miguel, historically ARENA, went for the FMLN, as well. (We heard this about 7 p.m. on election night. It was the thing that made me think Funes' victory really was possible.)
There is so much more to say but I don't want to put you off from reading what the experience really was about. Thank you for your interest!
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